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Background: Innovative neurosurgical treatments present a number of known risks, the natures and probabilities of which can
be adequately communicated to patients via the standard procedures governing obtaining informed consent. However, due to
their novelty, these treatments also come with unknown risks, which require an augmented approach to obtaining informed
consent.
Objective: This paper aims to discuss and provide concrete procedural guidance on the ethical issues raised by serious unex-
pected complications of novel deep brain stimulation treatments.
Approach: We illustrate our analysis using a case study of the unexpected development of recurrent stereotyped events in
patients following the use of deep brain stimulation (DBS) to treat severe chronic pain. Examining these unexpected complica-
tions in light of medical ethical principles, we argue that serious complications of novel DBS treatments do not necessarily make
it unethical to offer the intervention to eligible patients. However, the difﬁculty the clinician faces in determining whether the
intervention is in the patient’s best interests generates reasons to take extra steps to promote the autonomous decision making
of these patients.
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INTRODUCTION
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) treatments, particularly when
they are novel, raise new challenges for clinical ethics and clinical
protocol. Patients often will initially consent to novel DBS treat-
ments with limited information about potential complications
associated with that particular intervention (for that target site,
for that indication, for that sort of patient), due to its investiga-
tional nature. The limited information patients do have does not
generalize consistently, given individual differences in brain struc-
ture and function. How the consent process for novel DBS treat-
ments should present information to prospective DBS patients
about any serious unexpected complications emerging in the
existing individual cases needs attention. Novel DBS treatments
are not entirely exceptional among neurological interventions in
the challenges they raise. However, the increasing use of DBS in
novel targets, with the potential for irreversible consequences,
compounds the need to ensure there are adequate procedures
to support patient decision making. This is most acute in the
context of complications with unknown incidences and uncertain
implications. Novel DBS treatments thus constitute a priority cate-
gory of interventions for revisiting the ethical requirements for
patient consent.
DBS is a nonablative neurosurgical procedure that has been
used to ameliorate symptoms of neurological conditions, includ-
ing Parkinson’s Disease (1), dystonia (2), and chronic pain (3).
Although DBS is a powerful therapeutic tool, it also involves a
degree of risk. DBS involves a neurosurgical intervention with peri-
operative risks of haemorrhage (1.3–4%), epileptic seizures (0.4–
2.8%), and pneumonia (0.4–0.6%), among others (4,5). The long-
term presence of brain implants also brings risks of infection (2.8–
6.1%), lead migration or misplacement (5.1%) and skin erosion
(1.3–2%) among others (4). Finally, stimulation itself has been
associated with an array of adverse cognitive, behavioral, psychiat-
ric and psycho-social side-effects, depending on the targeted
brain area (4,6).
As is the case with any medical intervention, it is crucial that
patients adequately understand the nature and degree of the
risks attending the intervention, in addition to the likelihood of
therapeutic beneﬁt, prior to consenting to treatment. This is to
some extent less problematic in the context of carrying out DBS
on well-established targets for clear indications, since the
patient’s decision can be informed by existing data about the
attendant risks and the impact that adverse outcomes can have
on patients’ lives (although unexpected complications can
sometimes arise even in the context of well-established DBS
treatments) (7,8). However, when unexpected complications
occur in DBS therapies employing novel targets for new indica-
tions, there is no existing data to indicate whether any complica-
tions are a unique occurrence, or if they are likely to be
experienced by a large number of patients undergoing stimula-
tion. How this feature should be addressed in the consent pro-
cess is a pressing question. Further, this uncertainty makes
clinical determination of what is in a particular patient’s best
interests very difﬁcult.
In this paper, we discuss the ethical issues raised by serious unex-
pected complications of DBS by focusing on a case study of the unex-
pected development of recurrent stereotyped events in a number of
patients following the use of DBS in the treatment of severe chronic
pain. We conclude with clinical recommendations, including a new
protocol for an augmented consent process for novel DBS treatment.
SEIZURES AFTER ANTERIOR CINGULATE
CORTEX DBS
Medically refractory severe chronic pain can be debilitating, with
a severe impact on a person’s quality of life. Although DBS of targets
like the sensory thalamic nuclei (9) and periventricular gray (3) are
relatively well established for well-localized pain (e.g., segmental
poststroke pain), an effective target for poorly localized widespread
medically refractory pain has, until recently, proven more evasive.
The anterior cingulate cortex is an established target for pain relief
in terminally ill patients, most commonly pain associated with termi-
nal cancer (10). The established procedure, called cingulotomy, is
destructive lesioning of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). It is suc-
cessful in around 50% of patients, but side-effects are common, and
occur even in those who do not beneﬁt from pain relief. DBS has
several advantages over lesioning. The side-effects of DBS are con-
sidered reversible, operative complication rate is low, and DBS can
be “dosed” as symptoms change. DBS of the ACC was, therefore, an
option for those with nonterminal illness, unlike lesioning of the
ACC. The ACC DBS implant program for medically refractory pain
was pioneered in Oxford by the Functional Pain Neurosurgical team
under TA. As a (novel) public health-funded (on grounds of excep-
tional need) treatment, performed as clinical intervention, the pro-
gram did not require research ethics review (correspondence to TA
from REC, via UoX Senior Clinical Research Support Manager).
The ﬁrst patient was implanted on February 21, 2007. There was a
low rate of success during the week of trial stimulation initially. With
the recognition that bilateral implants, and higher stimulation
parameters were required, and with reﬁnement of surgical targeting,
results from late 2011 onwards indicated that 14 of 16 patients
(87.5% response rate) reported appreciable beneﬁt during the week
of trial stimulation, and went on to full implantation.
Pain is a complex symptom with at least three dimensions con-
tributing to its experience (11): the sensory dimension consists in
one’s awareness that one is in pain, how intense it is, where it is
located, and so on; the affective dimension consists in the experi-
enced unpleasantness, as well as emotional responses such as fear
or anger; the cognitive dimension consists in thoughts about the
pain, such as “I should go to the doctor” or “this is ruining my day.”
Stimulating the ACC seems to principally affect the affective
dimension of pain: patients were still aware that they were in pain,
but no longer found it aversive. Indeed, several patients described
feeling as if their pain was separate from them physically and said
that they did not think about it anymore, although they could still
sense it (12).
The outcomes of the ACC DBS program were published by Boc-
card et al. (12). In keeping with the hypothesis that ACC DBS targets
the affective dimension of pain, improvements on the visual ana-
logue scale for pain did not correlate with the more signiﬁcant
improvements in quality of life, as measured by the EQ-5D. The sig-
niﬁcant improvements in quality of life are striking in a patient
cohort with medically and surgically refractory pain (including in
several cases DBS of established pain targets like sensory thalamic
nuclei).
The success of this procedure was tempered by the onset of
recurrent stereotyped events in several patients. Some patients
experienced recurrent seizures, while two developed de novo epi-
lepsy. The Surgical Implant team or referring clinicians at other cen-
ters treated these events over a two-year period. The implant team
halted the ACC DBS program and requested a review of the ACC
program by the DBS Neurology service in 2014. Following review of
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medical notes and telephone interviews using a validated question-
naire, six patients were identiﬁed to have suffered recurrent stereo-
typed events suggestive of seizures. In one, events were felt to
related to alcohol abuse/withdrawal, and the patient declined spe-
cialist review. In another, events had ceased following explantation
(following infection), and the patient has declined follow up. Four
patients were identiﬁed to be suffering ongoing events, and
assessed by DBS Neurology service with clinical evaluation and EEG
video telemetry in 2015. A full clinical paper detailing the outcomes
of this evaluation is in preparation. Below, we summarise key
outcomes.
Patient one developed recurrent stereotyped neurological events
(“difﬁculty ﬁnding words”) above a certain (previously well tolerated)
threshold of stimulation intensity, 12 months after surgery. By the
time, he ﬁrst reported symptoms he had reduced stimulation inten-
sity. He recognized that the symptoms occurred above a certain
threshold, and that the threshold was falling over time. Ramping up
DBS stimulation intensity to above a certain threshold could reliably
reproduce symptoms and electrographic changes. Patient switched
off the stimulator as pain relief was felt to be minimal at safe stimu-
lation intensities. Seizures stopped occurring once the stimulation
was switched off, but the pain increased to preoperative levels
within weeks. Patient two suffered convulsive seizures at the very
high stimulation intensities required for near-complete pain relief, in
the immediate postoperative period. Stimulation intensities just
below the convulsive threshold were well tolerated for nearly two
years before Patient two reported stereotyped neurological events
(“lip smacking”). Patient two refused testing of stimulation thresh-
olds above those he recognized as safe during video-telemetry, but
like Patient one, has now switched off DBS as the threshold for seiz-
ures has fallen below that required for useful pain relief.
Patients three and four had a similar onset to the ﬁrst two
patients, but stimulation intensity was not turned down. Patient
three could not tolerate pain, and increased stimulation on his own
or resisted turning down stimulation. Patient four’s seizures were
unrecognized for some time, and even after seizures were recog-
nized. Patient four could not tolerate stimulation being turned
down. Patients three and four showed progressive increases in sei-
zure frequency and severity, with patient four eventually suffering
generalized convulsive seizures, possibly amounting to status epi-
lepticus. This occurred despite being on antiepileptic medication,
and despite stimulation being turned off. Thus, while Patients one
and two have stimulation-induced seizures, Patients three and four
developed de novo stimulation induced epilepsy (Table 1).
PRINCIPLES IN MEDICAL ETHICS
The four principles of medical ethics are well established (13). A cli-
nician must consider the ethical permissibility of certain acts, guided
by the principles of nonmaleﬁcence, beneﬁcence, respect for patient
autonomy, and justice. Nonmaleﬁcence requires that the clinician
does no harm to the patient; beneﬁcence requires the clinician to act
in the patient’s best interests; autonomy requires that the clinician
act in line with the expressed autonomous preferences of the
patient; justice requires clinicians to act in a way that is fair, in the
context of the wider population of patients. These principles some-
times come into conﬂict. Working out what to do requires careful
balancing of the ethically relevant considerations. In the interests of
brevity, we shall focus only on the ﬁrst three principles, bracketing
considerations of justice in this context. Justice determines what
resources are available for the use of medical procedures in deﬁned
patient groups. This typically uses cost-effectiveness analysis and
some theory of distributive justice, such as utilitarianism or egalitari-
anism. We focus here on what is ethically required for individual
patients, as such requirements must be met in any distributive sys-
tem, and can be discussed independently of broader considerations
of the global patient population.
Nonmaleﬁcence
Nonmaleﬁcence requires that the clinician does no harm to the
patient, and is often seen as the primary duty of a doctor: “First, do
no harm.” However, it is best considered together with beneﬁcence
in determining what is in a patient’s best interests: whether the
expected beneﬁts outweigh the expected harms.
Since ACC DBS-induced seizures could plausibly be seen as
directly harmful to the patient, and because ACC DBS might cause a
distinct, further medical condition, the principle of nonmaleﬁcence
might be thought to weigh decisively against offering the treat-
ment; this is especially so when the new condition is associated with
further risks (in extreme cases, perhaps of accidents or sudden unex-
plained death from epilepsy that may be greater than those accom-
panying chronic pain).
However, risk of seizures is not the only relevant consideration.
The purpose of medicine is not restricted merely to physiological
healing and survival. Indeed, the relief of pain is one of the primary
goals of medicine. Intractable chronic pain signiﬁcantly reduces the
patient’s quality of life, and ACC DBS was shown to improve quality
of life for some patients, notwithstanding some adverse events. Fur-
ther, depending on the patient, chronic pain might pose a signiﬁ-
cant indirect risk to life if it leads to depression and suicidal ideation.
In such cases, the threat to life posed by the DBS surgery and any
resulting seizures will not necessarily be greater than the indirect
threat to life presented by chronic pain. The principle of nonmaleﬁ-
cence, then, does not weigh decisively against offering ACC DBS.
Beneﬁcence
Beneﬁcence requires the clinician to act in the patient’s best inter-
ests. The determination of best interests can, however, be complex.
The evaluation should not only consider medical interests, but also
the patient’s overall interests or well-being, which have objective
and subjective elements. That is, some things will be good or bad
for all patients, while others will be good or bad depending on (and
as a consequence of) the patient’s desires and values. Where justice
allows the offering of a procedure, and that procedure is not clearly
against the patient’s interests, the patient should be offered the pro-
cedure and assisted in her assessment of whether the beneﬁts out-
weigh the risks, according to her goals and life plans. Accordingly,
beneﬁcence and respect for autonomy proceed in concert.
Given the magnitude of the risks associated with ACC DBS, it is
not straightforward to determine whether it is in patients’ best inter-
ests, generally speaking. As noted above, the likely effect on the par-
ticular patient’s quality of life will be a central consideration, and the
patient will often be best placed to assess how particular changes
would affect her quality of life. Indeed, it is notable that Patient three
continued using DBS as the pain was so severe, despite having
developed epilepsy. Patient one discontinued but observed that
DBS was effective. Differences in the overall effect of the interven-
tion on these patients’ quality of life may have factored into their
divergent decisions regarding continuation of treatment.
However, even knowing the patient’s view on the likely effects on
her wellbeing, it may still not be possible for the clinician to deter-
mine whether the intervention would be in her best interests: the
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signiﬁcance of the risks, and whether they are worth taking is some-
thing the patient must decide for herself. Given this, the need to pri-
oritize patient autonomy in this context becomes clear: while it is
not the case that undergoing ACC DBS for chronic pain is clearly
contrary the patient’s best interests, the uncertainty is such that the
intervention can be offered for the patient to consider, but not
recommended.
Respect for Autonomy
Given the uncertainty about whether ACC DBS will overall beneﬁt
the patient, there is a need to ensure that patients who opt to
undergo the procedure choose to do so autonomously. The signiﬁ-
cant clinical challenge, then, will be to make sure that the consent
process and related decision-making circumstances facilitate auton-
omous choice.
Beauchamp and Childress provide the standard account of what
is required for autonomous decision making (or action) (13). Accord-
ing to this account, aautonomous action is characterised “in terms
of normal choosers who act 1) intentionally, 2) with understanding,
and 3) without controlling inﬂuences that determine their action.”
This account is often supplemented with the additional criterion
that autonomous choices must not be irrational (see e.g., (14,15)); on
such views, individuals are most robustly self-governing when they
do not make errors in their reasoning. To make an irrational decision
is to make a decision on the basis of error. We will focus on the
errors that patients might make during the decision-making process.
Individuals can make two types of errors in their reasoning. First,
they may make errors in their reasoning about what to believe. For
instance, an individual may fail to give due consideration to avail-
able evidence that counts against a belief, and its logical or probabil-
istic implications. One of us (JS) has defended the claim that patient
reasoning should also involve vivid imagination of what the conse-
quences of their choices would be like for them (14). Second, individ-
uals may make errors in their reasoning about what to do. For
instance, an individual makes such an error if they choose to do
something that impairs pursuit of a goal that they want to achieve.
For example, if you think you need medical treatment and want to
avail yourself of it, yet repeatedly choose not to go to the doctor,
you act irrationally; you will fail to proceed toward your endorsed
goal of acquiring medical treatment.
INFORMED CONSENT AND PATIENT DECISION
MAKING: THE CASE OF ACC DBS
The decision-making process for novel DBS treatments, including
for chronic pain, must aim to avoid patients making errors in their
decisions. As explained above, this is a prerequisite for patients’ deci-
sions to be autonomous. Where the intervention is not clearly in the
patient’s best interests, as is the case with ACC DBS for chronic pain,
robust self-governance is all the more important. Accordingly, we
must consider whether patients might be susceptible to making
either of the two types of errors of reasoning that we delineated
above.
Is the Patient Failing to Achieve Her Goal in Choosing DBS?
The principal question in relation to the assessment of the chronic
pain patient’s means-end reasoning is whether treatment can be
expected to be effective in relation to the patient’s goal. The
patient’s goal might be construed narrowly (i.e., “to be pain free”) or
more broadly (“i.e., to have a better quality of life”). More broadly
construed, the net effect of the intervention on quality of life,
including any reductions in this quality resulting from seizures must
be considered in addition to the speciﬁc contribution made by the
presence or absence of chronic pain.
In relation to the former construal, it can be expected that ACC
DBS is likely to be effective in achieving the patient’s goal. The
data from the Oxford Implant Program demonstrated that most
patients experienced a reduction in the aversive component of
their pain, so were in an important sense free from pain, even if
the awareness of pain was still present. Thus, if the patient’s goal
is construed in this way, it can be rational for the patient to
choose to undergo ACC DBS, even given the risk of adverse side
effects (assuming seizures are not expected to result in a signiﬁ-
cant degree of pain).
However, things are more complicated if we construe the
patient’s goal more broadly, as the aim to “have a better quality of
life.” In relation to this goal, the means of ACC DBS may be more or
less effective depending on the effects that seizures would have on
the particular patient’s wellbeing, and, relatedly, depending on the
patient’s values.
Although we would expect the patient’s quality of life to be
improved by ceasing to experience her pain as aversive, her quality
of life may concurrently be decreased by the experience of seizures,
and the broader implications for her life activities. The ways in which
seizures compared with chronic pain affect a patient’s quality of life,
and which of these adverse experiences is the least bad will depend
in large part on the individual patient, her goals and values. In the
Oxford Implant Program, some patients chose to stop treatment
because of seizures (despite effective pain relief), while others
wanted to persist despite experiencing several seizures per day.
For example, imagine two patients who both have intractable
chronic pain, and who are medically similar in all other relevant
respects. One of these patients is a writer, while the other enjoys
driving and the freedom to explore that driving gives her. The writer
ﬁnds that her chronic pain prevents her from achieving the
immersed state of mind that she needs in order to write. She fully
appreciates the risks that attend DBS surgery, and has thought hard
about how seizures, if present, would affect her life. Although she
fears experiencing seizures, she feels conﬁdent that her quality of
life would on balance be improved, since she would be able to focus
again on her writing.
The driver, in contrast, is much less conﬁdent that the interven-
tion would have a net positive effect on her quality of life. She
realizes that experiencing seizures when driving would not only
be very dangerous, but might result in her being legally prohib-
ited from driving. She imagines her life without the aversive com-
ponent of chronic pain but with the signiﬁcant implications for
her prospect of being able to continue driving when and wher-
ever she wants, as she loves to do. She decides, on balance, that
the net effect on her quality of life would not be positive enough
to justify the intervention.
Although these examples are highly schematized, they serve to
illustrate that whether ACC DBS is a sufﬁcient means to achieve the
goal of improved quality of life will differ from patient to patient,
depending on what they value. This assessment will be further inﬂu-
enced by estimations of the likelihood of developing recurrent seiz-
ures, and the further likelihood that these seizures would cause
signiﬁcant harm. Taken together, these objective and subjective fea-
tures feed into an assessment of the overall expected outcome of
undergoing ACC DBS for the particular patient, and whether this
expected outcome is positive enough to render the decision to
undergo the intervention rational, or, indeed, in the person’s best
interests.
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Patients’ values are always relevant when a medical practitioner is
working out what to offer and recommend. ACC DBS is not unique
in this regard. However, the signiﬁcant differences between the
nature of seizures compared with chronic pain, and the varied
impact each can have on individuals’ lives make interrogation of
patient values acutely important in this case. The lack of objective
method to determine which is worse and what risks are worth tak-
ing does not mean that there is no way to determine what should
be done. On the contrary, patients with all the materially relevant
true beliefs will be able to give insight into what the implications
would be for their lives.
However, to be in the position to give such insight, patients must
not have made errors with respect to their reasoning about what to
believe. If they are to weigh up whether or not the intervention is
likely to improve their quality of life, they must have sufﬁcient
appreciation of the nature, implications, and likelihood of the inter-
vention’s consequences. We now turn to discussion of potential
sources of error in relation to beliefs.
Is the Patient’s Reasoning About the Material Facts Subject
to Error?
As noted above, one of us (JS) has previously argued that rational
decision making requires vividly imagining what the consequences
of our choices will be like for us (14). Fulﬁlling this condition in this
context requires more than the patient’s mere internalization of facts
about the probability of seizures and so on; in addition, the patient
must be able to vividly conceive of what her life would be like with
seizures and associated risks.
John Stuart Mill famously defended autonomy, or individuality as
he called it. Mill argued that each person has “privileged access”
into her own life (16), so individuals should be the ones to decide
what happens to them. Such privileged access may well be true of
the evaluation of chronic pain—the patient herself may be best able
to judge how bad the experience of the pain is. Indeed, third parties
may underestimate the badness of another’s chronic pain, and this
may lead them to formulate misinformed risk-beneﬁt analysis of the
treatment.
However, while patients often have privileged access to their
own experiences, they are not incorrigible in evaluating their own
interests. In particular, chronic pain patients may not be the best
judges of the badness of seizures that they are at risk of experi-
encing following DBS, but which they have not yet experienced. If
this is the case, patients will be susceptible to forming false beliefs
in relation to the nature and signiﬁcance of seizures and, corre-
spondingly, the overall assessment of the risk of seizures as all-
things-considered a risk worth taking. Such false beliefs could, in
turn, steer a decision to opt for treatment that does not in fact
serve their practical goal, as described above. Thus, the difﬁculty
that the clinician has in determining the patient’s best interests
can sometimes extend to the patient herself. Where the patient’s
difﬁculty in this regard is concomitant with a failure to reason
with materially relevant true beliefs, the patient’s autonomous
decision making is jeopardized.
Consequently, we must consider the possibility that chronic pain
inhibits the vivid imagination of potential seizures and the develop-
ment of epilepsy. For example, it is possible that the discomfort of
chronic pain results in an asymmetric focus on what life would be
like without the pain rather than on what life would be like with
seizures. Crucially, this exacerbates the difﬁculty that any individual
has in vividly imaging an entirely novel experience.
AUGMENTED CONSENT AND
DOCTOR–PATIENT DECISION MAKING
Clinicians, therefore, face a challenge in working out how to maxi-
mize a patient’s ability to imagine what living with seizures would
be like, and to helping the patient determine whether the interven-
tion is overall likely to improve her quality of life. Such information,
when grasped, increases the quality of patients’ consent. However,
ensuring that patients have all the materially relevant information,
and make decisions on its basis, is made harder by the fact that, at
least at present, treatment is investigational and probabilities cannot
be conﬁdently assigned. As a corollary, it is also important that the
risks are not overstated.
We, therefore, recommend an augmented consent process, to maxi-
mize the information the patient receives, and minimize the likelihood
that her autonomy is undermined through failures in reasoning. We
argue that such safeguards, as we set out in detail below, are most
effectively implemented through adopting a liberal rationalist
approach to doctor–patient decision making, which we outline now.
Liberal Rationalism and the Role of Doctors and Surrogates
in Patients’ Decisions
One of us (JS) has previously defended a model of the doctor–
patient relationship according to which doctors and patients should
engage in a rational discussion about which course of action is best
for the patient, all things considered (17). On this model of “liberal
rationalism,” it is assumed that doctors and patients may not share
the same set of values, and that neither party is incorrigible in their
evaluative judgments. In view of these assumptions, although liberal
rationalism advocates that patients should evaluate the available
material information, and come to their own judgment of what is
best, the model acknowledges that this process is best facilitated by
the patient engaging with an empathetic and reasonable physician
who is prepared to form their own understanding of what is in the
patient’s best interests.
In the light of epistemic uncertainty, discussion between the two
parties about the rationales underlying their judgments allows for the
best approximation of what is in the patient’s best interests. To illus-
trate, in the present context, the physician may believe that DBS is in
the patient’s best interests because of the severe nature of the
patient’s pain. Conversely, the patient might believe that the risk of
developing de novo epilepsy means that DBS is not in her best inter-
ests. In order to resolve this conﬂict, liberal rationalism would advocate
that the physician and patient engage in a rational discussion about
the justiﬁcation for their views about what is in the patient’s best inter-
ests. For instance, the physician may be able to further explain the
nature of the risk that the patient faces, andwhat sort of effect epilepsy
might have on the patient’s life in comparison to her chronic pain.
In contrast, the patient may be able to provide further reasons for
her judgment that the risk of developing epilepsy is not one that
she is willing to take; perhaps this would threaten her capacity to
continue in a particular profession in a way that her chronic pain
does not. The inclusion of proxy decision making adds a further
voice that may serve to highlight a further set of reasons to consider
in the treatment decision. Perhaps the patient’s spouse might pro-
vide a more accurate assessment of how well the patient is able to
cope with her chronic pain in her daily life.
The Augmented Consent Process for Novel DBS Treatments
In line with standard practice, all known possible side effects
should be discussed with the patient when obtaining informed
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consent for any surgery, and investigational DBS neurosurgery is no
exception.
In addition to identifying risks associated with all major operations
and anesthesia, existing forms for patient information and consent
for DBS already include sections on speciﬁc and general risks of DBS
(Box 1).
Box 1. Cambridge University Hospitals (Oct 2013),
“Patient information and consent to Insertion of a deep
brain stimulator (DBS)”
Speciﬁc risks of DBS
Short term adverse effects of stimulation
These are common and usually reversible with adjust-
ments in stimulation
• Eyelids closing
• Difﬁculty talking
• Limb or face contractions
• Jerky movements
• Visual ﬂashes
• Numbness or tingling in limb or face
• Anxiety and nausea.
Long term adverse effects of stimulation
These problems have been reported in a small number
of patients:
• Side effects caused by the stimulation as described above
that the patient ﬁnds intolerable so that the stimulator is
turned off
• Long term weight gain
• Depression
• In a small number of patients the equipment itself may
break or fail.
General risks of DBS
The risks of surgery in general includes problems with
the wound (e.g., infection) problems with breathing, such
as chest infection and blood clots, for example in the
legs and, less frequently, the lungs. According to pub-
lished scientiﬁc literature these risks associated speciﬁcally
with deep brain stimulation are:
• Blood clot in the brain causing permanent disability: two
patients out of 100
• Stroke or other neurological deﬁcit: one patient out of 100
• Infection of the leads: ﬁve patients out of 100
• Meningitis: less than one patient in 100
• Erosion of the wires through the skin: two patients out of
100
• Seizures: less than one patient in 100
• Weakening of the voice: ﬁve patients out of 100
• Short term confusion: ﬁve patients out of 100
• Death due to a blood clot: less than one patient in 100
However, where DBS surgery is investigational, and unexpected
side effects (such as seizures) emerge in patients who have under-
gone the procedure, these particular side effects should be
discussed in vivid detail with patients who are deciding whether to
undergo the same procedure.
This is because the small number of cases in investigational treat-
ments makes it impossible to generalize with respect to the impact
these unexpected complications have on patients’ quality of life
when they occur. Whether existing cases are likely to be common or
representative may not yet be clear.
Given the above, the clinician is unable to say yet whether, on bal-
ance, taking the risk is likely to be in a particular patient’s best inter-
ests. So, the patient cannot “outsource” this assessment to assume
the typical experience is likely to be her experience. The typical
experience is not known.
Consequently, an additional, discrete section must be included as
part of the information form, which will form the basis of directed
“vivid consideration” in the decision-making process. In this part of
the discussion, the patient must be prompted to think vividly about
what the unexpected side effect would mean for her life, were it to
occur. Ideally, the patient would be given the opportunity to talk to
someone who had experienced the unexpected side effect, or an
expert in patient experiences of the side effect. Including a surrogate
as part of this discussion should be encouraged.
The augmented consent process for novel DBS treatments would
therefore include an additional section, which would be updated
whenever a new signiﬁcant unexpected complication occurs (Box 2).
Box 2.
Serious adverse complications associated with investi-
gational DBS of [target area] for [neurological or psy-
chiatric condition]
• [Side effect]: [current incidence]
The small number of patients who have undergone DBS
of [target area] for [neurological or psychiatric condition]
make it difﬁcult for predictions to be made about precisely
how likely it is that you will experience this complication.
It is also difﬁcult to determine the typical experience of
[side effect] and its typical impact on the quality of life of
patients who undergo DBS of [target area] for [neurologi-
cal or psychiatric condition]. We, therefore, urge you to
discuss with your physician and a friend or relation how
[side effect] would impact your life in particular. If you
would like, and if possible, you may request a meeting
with an expert in patient experiences of [side effect].
When the likelihood that a signiﬁcant adverse complication (such as
seizures) will occur exceeds a certain threshold (e.g., 20% of patients),
the vivid consideration exercise should remain part of the consent pro-
cess. This should be so even when the number of cases is sufﬁcient to
determine the typical impact it has on the quality of life of patients.
AUGMENTED CONSENT IN PRACTICE
Having highlighted the ethical challenges of novel DBS proce-
dures consideration needs to be given to how these challenges
might be addressed in practice and to outline a practical approach
to seeking “augmented” consent. We outline the procedures we rec-
ommend for adoption in the following case example. This case
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example involved treatment with a novel device for a novel indica-
tion. What follows demonstrates the application of the more general
principles we outlined above. Full details of the augmented consent
process in this particular case are provided in Appendix.
Patient 4 was considered for implantation of a programmable
impulse generator that would allow seizure threshold to be moni-
tored at the same time as delivering stimulation. The clinical rationale
was that this device, the Activa PC&S (Medtronic), normally reserved
for investigational use in clinical trials, would allow direct and more
accurate measurements of seizure threshold. This in turn would allow
for accurate safe dosimetry of standard stimulation parameters. The
implant was approved for clinical use on the basis of compassionate
use in an exceptional circumstance by the MHRA, UK.
This was a novel procedure. It carried the known risks associated
with standard DBS procedures together with a number of unknown
risks that by their nature were unpredictable. The thrust of the aug-
mented consent process was to ensure that the patient was aware
of these unknown risks and understood the possible implications for
her. Although this process did not represent an assessment of men-
tal capacity, the test of capacity set out in the Mental Capacity Act
(2005) provided a helpful framework.
In the ﬁrst phase of the process, the patient was given a bespoke
information sheet and asked to study it in detail and to discuss it
with their signiﬁcant other. The information was presented in plain
English and included:
• a brief description of the procedure
• the risks of proceeding
• the risks of not proceeding
• the beneﬁts of proceeding
• the beneﬁts of not proceeding
A copy of the information sheet is provided in Appendix. The doc-
ument drew attention to the risks associated with standard DBS pro-
cedures but drew attention to the unknown risks that were attached
to the novel procedure.
In order to ensure that the patient had fully understood and
weighed the information concerning the procedure, three consulta-
tions were planned in order to check her retention of the informa-
tion, her understanding and the consistency of her responses. These
consultations included time with the patient alone and also with
their signiﬁcant other to establish their view on the decision. In
order to minimize the burden associated with traveling to the neu-
roscience center, two of these consultations were conducted face to
face via an Internet video call.
The consultation comprised a brief interview with the patient,
which included direct questioning about:
• her understanding of the procedure
• her recall of the risks and beneﬁts of proceeding or not proceeding
• her recall of the issue of unknown risks
• her decision about whether or not she wished to proceed.
Each session was documented in detail and the outcome shared
with the neurosurgical team. As outlined above, particular attention
was paid to her vivid understanding of the procedure and unknown
risks. In this case, she demonstrated reliable recall of the detail of
the procedure and the risks associated with it.
CONCLUSION
Innovative neurosurgical treatments present a number of known
risks, the natures and probabilities of which can be adequately
communicated to patients via the standard procedures governing
obtaining informed consent. However, they also come with unknown
risks, which require an augmented approach to the consent process.
The case study of ACC DBS for the treatment of chronic pain illumi-
nates the complicated ethical issues in this regard. The uncertainty
over the nature of the risks and their probability makes the determi-
nation of best interests more difﬁcult, and underscores the need for
the patient to make a rational, autonomous decision with respect to
her treatment. The augmented consent process we outline would
improve the quality of patient consent in the present case, and also
in other innovative applications of DBS where risks are uncertain.
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APPENDIX
Information Sheet
This information sheet provides details for the procedure that you are considering, together with the risks and possible beneﬁts of this procedure.
Procedure
The procedure that has been proposed is: Insertion of Medtronic PC&S Primary Cell Implanted Pulse Generator
The device will provide deep brain stimulation and also enable measurement your seizure threshold (i.e., the point at which increasing stimulation risks
causing a seizure). The device will be used to measure the level of stimulation that you are likely to be able to tolerate without a seizure.
The procedure to remove the old battery and replace it with the new one will involve being given an anaesthetic. This may be a general anaesthetic, or
alternatively some local anaesthetic will be given along with drugs to make you sleepy. The anaesthetist will discuss which is more suitable for you with
you before surgery.
Once this device is removed the new device will be inserted and connected to the leads that you already have in place.
After the operation, you will spend up to ﬁve days in hospital. While you are in hospital the DBS team will work with you to identify the best settings for
your new device. This will involve up to two programming/threshold ﬁnding sessions per day with a specialist nurse or Dr. Cheeran.
Risks of Proceeding
ACC DBS is a novel procedure. This IPG has not been used to measure seizure thresholds in humans before, although more than 50 have been implanted
in patients with Parkinson’s Disease for other reasons.
There are a number of known risks, which are set out below. It is also possible that the procedure might result in complications that cannot be predicted
(so called “unknown unknowns”). This means it is not possible to list all the possible risks.
Only the known risks are listed here.
• Seizure following anaesthesia
• Recurrence of seizures despite stimulation below detected seizure threshold
• Device fails to assess seizure threshold
• Pneumonia: 0.4–0.6%
• Infection: 2.8–6.1%
(if the IPG becomes infected the infection will be treated but the IPG will be removed and it will not be possible to replace it with another device)
• Skin erosion: 1.3–2%
• Death
Risks of Not Proceeding
• Current IPG device remains switched off
• No possibility of pain relief from IPG
• No change in frequency of seizures
• No reduction in pain relieving medication
Beneﬁts of Proceeding
• Possibility of pain relief with associated improvement in quality of life and day to day functioning
• Improved monitoring of seizure threshold which may mean that seizures can be reduced
• Possibility of reducing dosage of pain relieving medication
Beneﬁts of Not Proceeding
• Avoid known risks of surgery
• Avoid “unknown” risks
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